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A Survey of the Fraudulent
Conveyance in Bankruptcy
Paul 1.Hartman*
The fraudulent conveyance is of significant importance in bankruptcy.
It constitutes an act of bankruptcy; it can be avoided by the trustee in
bankruptcy; and it can be used to deprive the bankrupt of his discharge.

ProfessorHartman in this article surveys these three roles of the fraudulent conveyance.
I. INRODUCION

No debtor should be permitted to conceal or dispose of his property
for the purpose of preventing his creditors from satisfying their legal
claims. In ethical terms which have become classic, a debtor should
be just to his creditors before he can rightfully be generous with his
property for the benefit of others. The original and primary purpose
of bankruptcy legislation has been,1 and continues to be,2 a just distribution of the bankrupt's property among his creditors.
To help effectuate the purpose of bankruptcy legislation, the fraudulent conveyance is of major importance in three distinct respects. In
the first place, the so-called fraudulent conveyance or concealment
constitutes an act of bankruptcy 3 In the second place, the trustee in
bankruptcy is empowered by the Bankruptcy Act to set aside such
transactions and bring the property back into the bankrupt's estate
as an asset for the payment of claims of creditors.4 In the third place,
the debtor's fraudulent conveyance can be used to deprive him, as a
bankrupt, of his discharge. 5 As the title to this article indicates, the
writer has undertaken only to survey these three facets of the field of
the fraudulent conveyance; there is no attempt to give an exhaustive
treatment.
Legal condemnation of fraudulent conveyances is not new. Our
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. See Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 473 (1873).
2. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962).

3. Bankruptcy Act § 3a(1), as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1)

(1958).

4. Bankruptcy Act § 67d, as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(1958); Bankruptcy Act § 70e, as amended, 52 Stat. 897 (1932), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 110(e) (1958).
5. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), as amended, 52 Stat. 850 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (4)

(1958).
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notions of fraudulent conveyances, by and large, trace to the Statute
of 13 Elizabeth (commonly called the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances), enacted in England in 1570.6 In fact, even as early as 15421
English bankruptcy law regarded it as essential to the achievement
of the main purpose of such legislation that provisions be made to
recover for the benefit of creditors, property fraudulently disposed of
by the bankrupt; this concern has continued to the present day. In
1603 the English Bankruptcy Act and the Fraudulent Conveyances
Act were made complementary. The Bankruptcy Act was amended
to provide, first, that a fraudulent conveyance itself should be an act
of bankruptcy, and second, that the estate available for the creditors
should include property which the debtor had previously transferred
8
in fraud of creditors.
The Statute of 13 Elizabeth, regarded as the source of the American
law of conveyances in fraud of creditors, 9 became part of our inheritance. Colonial enactments more or less repeated the words, and certainly emphasized the principle.'? After the American Revolution, the
Statute of Elizabeth was re-enacted in some states, and in others the
courts considered it as part of the common law in force." Of course,
there have been divergencies in form among the states, but fundamentally this legislation remained pretty true to the original enactment in 13 Elizabeth.
The Statute of Elizabeth declared that conveyances "to the end,
purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors" were "clearly
and utterly void, frustrate and of no effect."' 2 This statute also had
additional provisions. It provided that the parties to such a fraudulent
conveyance were to forfeit one year's value of real property fraudulently conveyed and the whole value of goods and chattels, as well as
the face value of any feigned bond. One moiety of the forfeitures
was to go to the Queen, her heirs and successors, and the other moiety
to the "persons aggrieved." Recovery could be had in any of the
Queen's courts without essoin or protection of wager of law. Upon
conviction, the parties would also be imprisoned for one-half year
without bail.13 The Statute of 13 Elizabeth contained a saving clause
protecting the bona fide purchasers upon good consideration. 4 Neither
6. See 1 GLENN, FRAurDULmVr CONVEANcEs & PrEFn ENCES § 58 (1940) [hereinafter cited as GLENN].
7. See 4 COLLIER, BA-nEuPrcY f1 67.01 (14th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIm].
8. 1 GLENN § 61e.
9. 1 GLENN § 58.
10. See O'Neill v. Kilduff, 81 Conn. 116, 70 Ad. 640 (1908).
11. See Hall v. Alabama Terminal Co., 143 Ala. 464, 39 So. 285 (1905).
12. 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571).
13. 13 Eliz., c. 5, § 3 (1571).
14. Ibid.
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the criminal nor the forfeiture provisions of the Statute of Elizabeth
found lodgement in the fraudulent conveyance statutes enacted in
the United States.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which streamlined and
broadened considerably the scope of the earlier enactments stemming
from the Statute of Elizabeth, has been enacted in twenty-two states. 5
In 1938, the Uniform Act was substantially incorporated into section
67d of the Bankruptcy Act. This incorporation was done because it
was thought that the Uniform Act not only codified the better decisions of American courts applying the Statute of 13 Elizabeth but also
because it represented the best and the most recent legislative experience on the subject. 16
II. FR umULENT CoNVEYANcES AND CoNcEALmmNTs
AS Acrs OF BANKUPTCY

Earlier we saw that in our present day bankruptcy jurisprudence
the fraudulent conveyance is of major importance in three distinct
respects, one of those being that it constitutes an act of bankruptcy.
The first act of bankruptcy is the fraudulent conveyance or concealment. Showing the impact of the Statute of Elizabeth, prior to 1952
this act of bankruptcy was set forth essentially in the classic fraudulent conveyance language of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, requiring a
concealment or transfer by a debtor with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud his creditors. Specifically, the first act of bankruptcy consisted
of a person's having "conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or
permitted to be concealed or removed any part of his property, with
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them." 17
The essential ingredients of this act of bankruptcy were, therefore,
the (a) disposition of the bankrupts property either by himself or
with his permission (b) with the intent to interfere with creditors'
remedies.'
In 1952 the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy was
substantially revamped. The 1952 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act
changed the first act of bankruptcy by adding an alternative ground
by which the debtor could make a fraudulent conveyance that would
constitute an act of bankruptcy. This amendment, which remains in
our present Bankruptcy Act, added as an alternative first act of bankruptcy the making or suffering of a transfer "fraudulent under the pro15. See 9B UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 45 (Supp. 1962).
16. 4 CourxER f[ 67.02.
17. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)

(1958).
18. See I CoLiER f 3.101.
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visions of Section 67 or 70" of the Bankruptcy Act.' 9 So, the first act
of bankruptcy now set out by section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act consists of a person's having concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed any part of his property, with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them, or made or suffered a
transfer of any of his property, fraudulent under the provisions of sections 67 or 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
As we shall see in more detail later,20 the upshot of this 1952 amendment is to abrogate, in part, the so-called "fraudulent intent" as an
essential element of the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy. This results from the fact that a transfer of property may be
fraudulent under the provisions of sections 67 or 70 of the Bankruptcy
Act, thus constituting an act of bankruptcy, without regard to actual
fraudulent intent. Certain provisions in section 67d of the Bankruptcy
Act, following the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, expressly
stigmatizes specific types of transactions as fraudulent without regard
to actual intent. All that is now necessary to establish a fraudulent
conveyance as an act of bankruptcy is a showing of a transfer of the
bankrupt's property either by himself or with his permission which
will be regarded as fraudulent under sections 67 or 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
According to the reports of the Congress which passed the 1952
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, providing that a transfer that is
fraudulent under sections 67 or 70 of the Act should constitute an act
of bankruptcy, the purpose of that amendment was to effect a correlation between section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act and sections 67 and 70.
The intended result was, first, that a transfer fraudulent under the latter two sections should also constitute an act of bankruptcy under section 3a of the Act and, second, that under section 3a(1) of the Act as
thus amended an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors no longer
be a requisite for the commission of the first act of bankruptcy. 21 It is
not completely certain, however, that some courts consider this congressional objective of correlating section 3a with sections 67 and 70
to be completely achieved. In refusing to hold that a debtor's bulk
sales contract constituted an act of bankruptcy, Judge Frank, speaking
for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, declared: "The fact
that a trustee in bankruptcy, under Section 67, sub. d(2), can set
aside such an 'obligation' as fraudulent does not render the incurring
of the 'obligation' an act of bankruptcy." z2
Later, we will have occasion to consider somewhat in detail parts
19.
20.
21.
22.

Bankruptcy Act § 3a, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1958).
See notes 24-35 & 62-73 infra and accompanying text, where this is discussed.
H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
Allen v. Camp Ganeden, Inc., 214 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1954).
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of sections 67 and 70 of the Act, when we have a look at the bankruptcy trustee's arsenal of weapons for attacking transactions made
by the debtor prior to bankruptcy. 3 Perhaps it will be enough at
this point simply to summarize the pertinent provisions of sections
67 and 70, which describe actions of the debtor that can be regarded
as fraudulent conveyances, which the Act says will constitute the first
act of bankruptcy.
A. Summary of Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act
Section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act, which adopts in substance
sections 4 to 7 inclusive of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
contains four paragraphs under which transfers are considered fraudulent and, therefore, presumably within the first act of bankruptcy, if
the transaction occurred within one year of the bankruptcy petition,
as defined by the Act.24
The first provision of section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act perhaps
finds its most frequent application in the case of gifts by an insolvent
debtor. Thus, clause 2a of section 67d, taken from section 4 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, provides that every transfer
made and every obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to
existing creditors, if made or incurred without fair consideration when
the debtor is insolvent or thereby rendered insolvent, without regard
to the debtor's actual intent2 However, it must be observed that the
Act provides that only existing creditors are declared to be defrauded
under this clause.
The second provision of section 67d concerns the debtor who engages in business with unreasonably small capital. Clause 2b of section 67d, also from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, provides
that every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor
is deemed fraudulent, without regard to the debtor's actual intent,
where the transfer is made or an obligation is incurred without fair
consideration by a debtor about to engage or who is engaged in a
business transaction, for which the property remaining in his hands is
an unreasonably small capital.26 Both existing creditors and those
becoming creditors during the continuation of the debtor's business
are declared to be defrauded by this clause.
23. See material on the power of the trustee in bankruptcy to set aside fraudulent
conveyances, pp. 397-418 infra.

24. Bankruptcy Act § 3b, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1942), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b)
(1958).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (2)(a) (1958).
26. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(b), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (2)(b) (1958).
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The third provision of section 67d deals with the problem of transfers without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur debts
beyond his ability to pay as they mature. This, too, comes from the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Clause 2c of section 67d condemns as fraudulent, without regard to the debtor's actual intent,
transfers made or obligations incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature.2 7 Such transactions are expressly made fraudulent as to both existing and future creditors.
The fourth provision of section 67d of the Act deals with transfers
made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Clause
2d of section 67d condemns as fraudulent those transfers made and
obligations incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent
presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.28 Both existing and future creditors are declared to be defrauded by this clause
of the Act. In essence, this clause incorporates the main fraudulent
conveyance provisions of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, and is again
taken from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.29
The fifth provision of section 67d has no counterpart in the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. It stigmatizes as fraudulent certain types
of security transactions. Thus, paragraph 3 of section 67d brands as
fraudulent a transfer made with intent to use the consideration to
finance a preference. Specifically, this provision of the act condemns
as fraudulent a transfer of security by an insolvent debtor, contemplating bankruptcy, where the debtor gives the security for a loan
and the lender has knowledge that the money is to be used to pay off
debts. 30 The security transaction is declared fraudulent regardless of
whether the payment to the creditor constituted a voidable preference
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.31 It seems clear, however,
that in order for the security transaction to be regarded as fraudulent,
the transferee of the security must have knowledge of the use to be
made of the consideration for the transfer.32 This provision of section
67d has a four-month limitation before the date of bankruptcy in
which the security must have been given in order for it to be fraudulent and voidable.
27. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(c), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (2) (c) (1958).
28. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2) (d), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §

107(d) (2)(d) (1958).

29. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(c), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(2)(c) (1958).
30. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3), as amended, 66 Stat 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (3) (1958).
31. This is the situation as developed in Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
32. Rittenberg v. Kaplan, 12 F.2d 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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The sixth provision of section 67d, derived from section 8 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, deals with fraudulent conveyances by partnerships. Thus, section 67d(4) makes fraudulent any
transfer of firm property to partners, or for consideration moving to
partners, which leaves the firm insolvent.3 3 A one-year limitation is

imposed here, and the transaction is fraudulent as to partnership credi-

at the time of such transfer, without regard to actual
tors existing
34
intent.
There is a saving clause in section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act.
While all the transactions stigmatized as fraudulent conveyances under section 67d are declared null and void against the trustee in bankruptcy, nevertheless section 67d(6) provides that such transactions
fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee
shall not be void as against a bona
35
consideration.
fair
for a present
We will have considerably more to say about the provisions of section 67d when we explore the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy to
set aside fraudulent conveyances.36
B. Summary of Transactions as Acts of Bankruptcy Under
Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act
Already we have seen that a transfer will be regarded as fraudulent
and therefore within the scope of the first act of bankruptcy when it
is fraudulent under the provisions of section 70 of the Bankruptcy
Act.37 Section 70e is the main provision here. That section provides,
in substance, that the trustee may avoid any transfer by a debtor
which by applicable federal or state law is fraudulent or voidable
as to any creditor having a provable claim in bankruptcy. 38 The scope
of section 70e will be considered much more in detail a bit later when
we have a look at the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid
a fraudulent conveyance and bring the asset back into the estate for
payment of creditors.3 9
C. Elements of the Fraudulent Conveyance as an Act of Bankruptcy
1. The Fraudulent Transfer-(a) What Constitutes a Transfer.-In
33. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(4), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952),
107(d) (4) (1958).
34. Ibid.
35. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952),

107(d) (6) (1958).

11 U.S.C. §
11 U.S.C.

§

36. See material on power of trustee in bankruptcy to set aside fraudulent conveyances, pp. 397-418 infra.
37. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
38. Bankruptcy Act § 70e, as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(e) (1958).
39. See material on the trustee's power to set aside fraudulent transfers under §
70e of the Bankruptcy Act, pp. 397-418 infta.
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essence, the debtor can commit the first act of bankruptcy either by
a concealment of his property or by a fraudulent transfer of his property.40 Presently we will have a look at the meaning of "concealment."
At this point we are concerned with the meaning of "transfer." A
"transfer" as defined by the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (as amended in
1952) is quite comprehensive in scope, and includes all sorts of security devices. Section 1(30) of the Act provides that:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or
upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, a voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien encumbrances, gift, security, or
otherwise; the retention of a security title to property4 delivered to a debtor
shall be deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor. '

It can readily be seen that "transfer" within the meaning of the Act
defining "acts of bankruptcy" is quite inclusive, and several types of
transactions may now constitute fraudulent transfers, although they
were not so treated prior to the 1938 amendment of the Act.4 Most
frequently a fraudulent conveyance consists of a voluntary transfer
to a third person. However, the present enlarged definition of "transfer" appears sufficiently broad to include virtually every type of transfer, whether voluntary or involuntary.
(b) Time When the Transfer Occurs.-Section 3b of the Bank,ruptcy Act provides that a petition may be filed against a person
43
within four months after the commission of an act of bankruptcy.
Reading further in the Act, complications arise as to when the fourmonth period expires as to the "transfer" allegedly constituting the
.first act of bankruptcy, the fraudulent conveyance. Section 3b of the
Act provides that the four-month period shall not expire until four
months after the date when the transfer became so far perfected that
no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could thereafter have acquied rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein." Thus it will be seen that for purposes of com40. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952),
(1958).

11 U.S.C. § 21(a)

41. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), as amended, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30)
(1958).
42. See 1 CoLU II 3.102.
43. Bankruptcy Act § 3b, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. 21(b)
(1058).
44. Ibid, Although there is no requirement that a transfer of corporate stock be
recorded, the four months' period for using a fraudulent stock transfer as an act of
-bankruptcy 'did not start running, in the absence of knowledge by the petitioning
creditors, at least until the transferee took "notorious, exclusive, or continuous" posses-
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puting the time under section 3b of the Act the transfer is deemed to
be made when the parties to the transfer have done everything necessary in the way of recording or taking possession to fulfill the requirements of relevant state law so that the transfer would be good as
against subsequent transfers by the transferring debtor. In short, a
transfer is not made until it becomes known or discoverable by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. The purpose of such requirement is,
of course, to prevent fraudulent transfers from becoming unassailable
as fraudulent conveyances by reason of being kept secret until the
limitation period has expired.
(c) Constructive Notice to Subsequent Creditor as Negating
FraudulentAspect of Transfer.-In order for a recordable transfer to
constitute the first act of bankruptcy, it seems clear that the bankruptcy petition must be filed within four months after the date of the
recordation, since recording perfects the transfer and starts the fourmonth period. But what about the impregnability of the fraudulent
transfer as against a creditor who became such after the date of recording and who, as a petitioning creditor, joins in the filing of the
bankruptcy petition before the four-month period has expired? Has
the first act of bankruptcy been committed as to this creditor? We
have seen that under section 67d of the Act certain types of transfers
are fraudulent as to existing creditors, as well as to creditors who became such after the questioned transfer. 45 Does the constructive notice
of the fraudulent transfer, by virtue of its recordation, prevent the
subsequent creditor from claiming that he was defrauded? That is to
say, is the creditor charged with constructive knowledge of a transfer
that turns out to be fraudulent, so that he cannot- successfully claim
that the transfer was fraudulent as to him?
The only relevant law that has been found regarding the effect of
recordation as negating, as to a subsequent creditor, the fraudulent
aspect of a recorded transfer concerns the right of the subsequent
creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy to set aside such recorded
transfers. Such cases, especially those construing the sections of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act that corresponds to the relevant
sections of the Bankruptcy Act, are persuasive, but of course they are
not decisive, particularly those decided by state courts. Unfortunately,
such cases as have been found are not in agreement on whether the
recordation of a fraudulent transfer prevents it from being fraudulent
as to creditors who become such after the recordation. As will be
seen in an analysis of the cases, even the courts of a single state have
Sion of the stock, as then required by the Act to start the four-month period. Theard
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 202 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1953)..

45. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
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taken opposite positions on this question from time to time.
If the creditor actually knows when he gives credit that his debtor

has made a fraudulent conveyance, there is authority to the effect
that the conveyance is not fraudulent as to him; it might be found that
such subsequent creditor impliedly approved the prior fraudulent conveyance. 46 "But it is one thing to know of the conveyance," as Mr.
MacLachlan, an authority in the field, has so aptly said, "and another
to know of the fraud." 47 Continues Mr. MacLachlan, in speaking of
the subsequent creditor's right to attack a fraudulent conveyance:

"The law will not tolerate the concealment of assets with evil intent,
even if empowering the creditor to reach such assets permits him to
get satisfaction in a manner somewhat different from that which he

had anticipated."4

Consequently, a good many jurisdictions passing

on the point have taken the position that the subsequent creditor is
not precluded from attacking a fraudulent conveyance by anything

except knowledge, or actual notice, that the conveyance was fraudulent. The subsequent creditor is thus not prejudiced in his efforts to
notice
set aside a fraudulent conveyance solely by the constructive
49
that is afforded by recordation of the fraudulent transfer.

Moreover, when the trustee in bankruptcy seeks to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance on behalf of those who become creditors subse-

quent to the recordation of such conveyance, he has not been prevented
from upsetting the conveyance by reason of the constructive knowl-

edge of the recordation of the transfer5 0 There is authority, however,

to the effect that where the fraudulent transfer is recorded before the
creditor's claim arises, the creditor is charged with constructive knowlthe conveyance, which is not, therefore, fraudulent as to the
edge of 51
creditor.
46. In re Campbell's Estate, 164 Misc. 632, 299 N.Y. Supp. 442 (Surr. Ct. 1937);
Long v. True, 149 Tenn. 673, 261 S.W. 669 (1924); see State v. Nashville Trust Co.,
28 Tenn. App. 388, 418-19, 190 S.W.2d 785, 796-97 (M.S. 1944); 1 GLNN, § 343c;
24 Am. Jtm. FraudulentConveyances § 145 (1939). However, there is some authority
which seems to say that the subsequent creditor can successfully attack a fraudulent
conveyance even though he had knowledge of the fraudulent conveyance before he
extended credit. Pope v. Bain, 6 N.J. 351, 78 A.2d 820 (1951).
47. McLaughlin (MacLachlan), Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 46 HAnv. L. REv. 404, 430 (1932).
48. Id. at 431.
49. McCanless v. Smith, 51 N.J. Eq. 505, 25 Atl. 211 (Ch. 1892); Marshall v. Roll,
139 Pa. 399, 20 Atl. 999 (1891); see Davis v. Cassels, 220 Fed. 958, 966 (N.D. Ala.
1915). In Bailey v. Way, 266 Mass. 437, 165 N.E. 388 (1929), a subsequent mortgagee
was not prevented from upsetting a prior fraudulent mortgage by reason of the record,
although complainant's mortgage recited that it was subject to all mortgages of record.
50. McBride v. Bertsch, 58 F.2d 797 (W.D. Mich. 1930), modified, 58 F.2d 799
(6th Cir. 1932); see 4 CoLuma, ff 67.35, at 364.
51. Butler v. Holland, 200 Tenn. 57, 289 S.W.2d 701 (1956); Ledford v. Lee, 29
Tenn. App. 660, 200 S.W.2d 393 (E.S. 1946). There have been intervals, however,
when Tennessee seemed committed to the contrary view. See Churchill v. Wells, 47
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As we have already seen, section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act condemns certain types of transactions as fraudulent conveyances (and
therefore treats them as constituting the first act of bankruptcy) even
as to those who became creditors subsequent to the making of transfers. 52 It cannot, therefore, with reason be said that the trustee's or
subsequent creditors' rights depend upon being misled by the debtor.
The reason for nullifying such conveyances is that the law simply
should not permit a debtor to conceal his assets with the evil intent of
defrauding his subsequent creditors. To hold that such recordation
prevents a transfer from being fraudulent as to subsequent creditors
devitalizes, in so far as recordable transactions are concerned, those
provisions of section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act (and of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act as well) which expressly declare that certain types of transfers are fraudulent conveyances as to existing as
well as to subsequent creditors. Such decisions open an avenue
whereby a scheming debtor can make fraudulent conveyances foolproof as to future creditors by making a prompt recordation of his
fraudulent transactions.
Moreover, in the writer's opinion, courts that refuse to permit a subsequent creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance solely because
of constructive notice of the recorded deed misapply the recording
statutes. The purpose of such statutes is to make void, as to certain
purchasers and creditors, transactions because they are not recorded.
It is difficult to believe that one of the purposes of the recording
statutes is to serve as a balm of Gilead to cleanse the mephitic stench
from a fraudulent conveyance.
2. Concealment or Removal of Property as a Fraudulent Conveyance.-The first act of bankruptcy (fraudulent conveyance) can also
be committed where the debtor is guilty of concealment of his property, as well as where he has actually transferred his property. Specifically, section 3a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act declares that the
first act of bankruptcy is committed when the debtor has concealed,
removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed any of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of
Tenn. 364, 372-73 (1870); Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 311-12, 64 S.W.2d
227, 232-33 (M.S. 1932). Likewise wedded to the view that constructive notice is
enough to prevent the subsequent creditor from upsetting a fraudulent conveyance are
Kentucky and Texas. See First Nat'l Bank v. Holbrook, 309 Ky. 326, 217 S.W.2d
787 (1949); Perry v. Brown, 76 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1934). See also 24 Am. Jun.

FraudulentConveyances § 145 (1939).
52. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text. Thus, sections 67d(2) (b)-(d)
and 67d(3) all make certain types of transfers fraudulent both as to existing and future
creditors. Bankruptcy Act §§ 67d(2)(b)-(d), 67d(3), as amended, 66 Stat. 427
(1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(d)(2)(b)-(d), 107(d)(3) (1958).
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them.53 In the definitional sections, the Bankruptcy Act provides that
"conceal" shall include secrete, falsify, and mutilate.14 This definition
does not purport to be exclusive. Consequently, interpretations given
that term by the courts must be looked to in order to determine the
full scope of its meaning. The courts have construed "conceal" to
mean to hide or withdraw from observation, to carry or keep from
sight, to prevent discovery of, or to withhold knowledge of the existence, ownership, or location of property.5 5 Proof of concealment
does, however, require something more than a mere failure to volunteer information to creditors.56 The 1952 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which substantially broadened the scope of the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy, did not affect that facet of
the first act of bankruptcy dealing with "concealments." "Concealments" still retain the terminology of the ancient Statute of 13 Elizabeth to the effect that in order to constitute the act of bankruptcy,
with intent to hinder, delay, or
property must have been concealed
57
defraud creditors or any of them.
The first act of bankruptcy also specifies that the act can be committed where the debtor removed any part of his property with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them. 8 "Removal"
includes an actual or physical change in the position or locality of
property of the debtor resulting in a depletion of his estate.59 Where
a debtor, contemplating voluntary bankruptcy, consigns his property
to a person outside the district with intent to keep such property from
the trustee, he has committed an act of bankruptcy.60 A debtor who
absconds and takes a portion of his property with him not only "conceals" his property, but61he also "removes" it so as to fall within the
first act of bankruptcy.
(3) The Element of Intent in the Fraudulent Conveyance as an
Act of Bankruptcy.-The basic idea of fraudulent conveyances is that
the transferor and transferee have done a wicked thing. An essential
feature is that a debtor has meant to defraud some creditor, or that
the debtor has acted in such a reckless manner by transferring his
53. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)

(1958).
54. Bankruptcy Act § 1(7), reenacted without change, 52 Stat. 840 (1938),

11

U.S.C. § 1(7) (1958).
55. 1 CoLLE , 3.103[El], at 416.

56. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Winter, 153 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 717 (1946); In re Napco Mfg. Co., 72 F. Supp. 555 (D. Neb. 1947).
57. Supra note 52.

58. Ibid.

59. See In re McGraw, 254 Fed. 442 (D.C.W. Va. 1918).
60. In re Hammond, 11 Fed. Gas. 380 (No. 5,999) (D.C. Mass. 1869).
61. In re Terry, 97 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Ark. 1951); In re Filer, 108 Fed. 209

(D.N.Y. 1900).
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property without consideration that a fraudulent intent will be inferred as an objective fact, without regard to actual state of mind.
Already it has been suggested that an actual fraudulent intent is an
element in a fraudulent conveyance under only certain types of transfers. Thus, under section 3a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act (as amended
in 1952), an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is no longer
an essential requirement for the commission of the first act of bankruptcy, unless the creditors elect to make it so under the first part of
that section, concerning concealing, removing, or permitting to be
removed or concealed any part of his property with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud his creditors.2 The creditors may be able to show
a fraudulent conveyance under the second part of section 3a(1) of
the Act by showing a transfer that is fraudulent by reasons of sections
67 or 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, without showing an actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. An actual fraudulent intent is an
element only in certain types of transactions under these two sections
of the Act.63 Thus, intent to defraud is no longer an element of a
fraudulent transfer, except insofar as it is made an element by sections
67d or 70e of the Act, relative to the questioned transfer. While there
remains the basic notion that in a fraudulent conveyance the grantor
has the purpose to defraud, yet that intent may be inferred in some
instances without regard to actual state of mind, as in the case of a
gift by an insolvent debtor. As we shall see, this is made a positive
64
rule of law by section 67d.
Section 70e provides that any transfer by a debtor which by applicable federal or state law is fraudulent or voidable against a creditor is vulnerable to an attack by the trustee. 65 Are all of the transactions condemned by this section to be regarded as falling within the
purview of the first act of bankruptcy? Likely not all such transactions
will qualify as acts of bankruptcy, even though they fall under the
condemnation of section 70e. It must be observed that the present
section 3a(1) of the Act does not declare that transfers merely voidable under sections 67 or 70 of the Act are fraudulent conveyances that
will constitute an act of bankruptcy. Specifically, section 3a(1) condemns as acts of bankruptcy only those transfers that are "fraudulent"
within the meaning of sections 67 and 70 of the Act. Presently we
will see that some transactions that are condemned by section 70e of
the Act can be upset by the trustee merely because they are voidable;
62. See 1 CoLLIE f[
3.101.
63. See notes 101-22 infra and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of this point.
64. See notes 101-22 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the provisions
of section 67d where intent will be inferred as a matter of law.
65. Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §

110(e)(1) (1958).
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they need not also be characterized as fraudulent under the relevant
state law in order for the trustee to strike them down. 66 Thus, transfers that can be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy under section
70e of the Act because they are voidable under state law would seem
not to constitute an act of bankruptcy, unless the state law also characterizes such voidable transfers as "fraudulent." 67 However, as we
have also seen, if the alleged first act of bankruptcy is bottomed
intent to
solely on the "concealment" of property by the debtor, then
68
requirement.
a
still
is
creditors
hinder, delay, or defraud
When intent to hinder, delay or defraud is an element, at what
time must the intent by the debtor have existed? Section 3b of the
Act answers that question for us. It expressly provides that it is sufficient if the intent exists either at the time when the transfer was
made, or at the time when the transfer was perfected. 69 While section
3b of the Act requires that the fraudulent transaction must have occurred within four months of the filing of the petition in order to be
an act of bankruptcy, nevertheless, as we have already seen, the fourmonth period does not start running until the transaction becomes
so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could
thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred or
assigned superior to the rights of the transferee or assignee therein. 0
Where fraudulent intent is an element of the first act of bankruptcy
it may be implied. Thus, where it appears that the purpose of certain
transfers was to put the debtor's property beyond the reach of his
creditors and where the debtor professes to be unable to show the
71
disposition of the money received, intent to defraud may be implied.
The adequacy of the consideration received for a conveyance which
is alleged to be fraudulent is a material factor in proving the existence
of a fraudulent intent. If the consideration received is full, fair, and
adequate, it may be virtually impossible for the petitioning creditors
to carry the burden of proving the bankrupts fraudulent intent. 2 Of
course, a transfer is presumptively fraudulent when the debtor transfers all of his property and there has been no provision for the pay66. See material on the trustee's power to set aside fraudulent transfers under section
70e of the Bankruptcy Act, pp 397-418 infra.
67. See MAcLACHLAN , BANKR PTcY 43-44 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MACLc,Axl. For cases illustrating the various types of transfers from which this act of
bankruptcy may be spelled out, see 1 REm GToN, BANRUmTcY § 119 (5th ed. Henderson 1950).
68. See notes 53-61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
69. Bankruptcy Act § 3b, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b)
(1958).
70. Time when the transfer occurs, pp. 388-89 supra.
71. See In re Minard, 156 Fed. 377 (D. Ore. 1907).
72. Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co.v. Bardsley, 237 Fed. 673 (8th Cir. 1916).
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ment of his debts.73 However, an intention to defraud clearly cannot
be found unless at the time of the transaction the debtor knew or had
reason to know of the existence of one or more creditors who could
not be satisfied out of the remaining assets. 4
(4) Meaning of "Creditor."-Sincethe thrust of fraudulent conveyance law is aimed at preventing the debtor from harming his creditors, there naturally arise questions regarding the meaning of "creditor."
The meaning of that term is not completely free from uncertainty in
determining whether a fraudulent transfer amounts to an act of bankruptcy. Troublesome questions may arise as to whether the party
(petitioning creditor) alleging a fraudulent conveyance must possess
a claim that will be provable against the debtor's estate if the debtor
is thrown into bankruptcy, and that will thus share in the bankrupt's
assets, if any. Section 1(11) of the Bankruptcy Act is a source of some
question whether the claimant must hold a provable claim. That section provides that "creditor" shall include anyone who owns a debt,
demand or claim provable in bankruptcy.75 It will be seen that this
definition describes a "creditor' only in terms of somebody having a

"provable" claim. It is doubtful, however, that the meaning of "creditor" is thus limited in determining whether a transfer is in fraud of
creditors so as to constitute an act of bankruptcy.76 First, it should be
noted that this definition does not purport to be all-inclusive; rather it
belongs to that definition class which is couched in terms of "shall indude." In American Surety Co. v. Marotta7 the Supreme Court refused to limit "creditor" to mean one having a provable claim. Rather,
Marotta concluded that the statutory phrase "shall include" cannot
reasonably be read to be the equivalent of "shall mean" or "shall inlude only."78 The Court defined "creditor" in terms of common law
concepts, and held that a party was entitled to file an involuntary
petition and to charge, as an act of bankruptcy, a transfer with intent
to defraud creditors, even though at the time of the transfer the claim
against the debtor was contingent and thus regarded as not provable
under the Bankruptcy Act governing the matter in question.79 The
73. Boston W. Africa Trading Co. v. Quaker City Morocco Co., 261 Fed. 665
(1st Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 429 (1920).
74. In re Fersko, Inc., 250 Fed. 357 (2d Cir. 1918).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 1(11), as amended, 44 Stat. 662 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(11)

(1958).
76. For discussion of meaning of creditor, see 1 CoLum [ 1.11.
77. 287 U.S. 513 (1933).
78. See American Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517-18 (1933).
79. In Marotta, the transfer by an indenitor of a surety of the indemnitor's property
after verdict against the principal, but before judgment, constituted an act of bankruptcy as made with intent to defraud the surety who was a creditor for the purpose,
although the surety's claim against the indemnitor was at the time of the transfer only
contingent. The Bankruptcy Act now expressly permits contingent claims to be proved.
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Court emphasized that under the common law rule a creditor having
only a contingent claim is protected against fraudulent conveyances,
We must not lose sight of the fact that a transaction that is fraudulent under section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act constitutes a conveyance that will be regarded as the first act of bankruptcy. 80 For the
purpose of determining whether there has been a conveyance in fraud
of creditors within the purview of section 67d, the Bankruptcy Act
now contains a special definition of the term "creditor."81 That section now provides that a "creditor" is a person in whose favor a "debt"
exists. 82 Further, for the exclusive purpose of 67d of the Act it is
provided that "debt" is any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent.83
These definitions of "debt" and "creditor" in section 67d of the Act
do not purport to limit "creditor" to persons holding only provable
claims. Thus, a person having a tort claim based on the debtor's
negligence would appear to be a "creditor"; yet his claim would not
be provable unless suit is pending at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.84 However, as we will see more fully later,8" the
trustee in bankruptcy cannot avoid a fraudulent transaction under
section 67d of the Act unless he represents a creditor having a provable claim. Some uncertainty is injected into the term "creditor" by
reason of the fact that the definition of "debt" in the definitional
sections of the Act provides merely that the term "shall include" any
debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy.8 6
(5) Solvency of the Debtor as a Defense.-As we have had occasion to see earlier, insolvency need not necessarily be alleged or
proved in connection with the fraudulent conveyance as an act of
bankruptcy, although where fraudulent intent is alleged as an element, insolvency is helpful in establishing the "fraudulent intention."87
11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8)
(1958).
80. See Bankruptcy Act § 3a, as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)
(1958).
81. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(1) (1958).
82. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(a), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (1)(c) (1958).
83. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(b), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (1)(b) (1958).
84. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), as amended, 48 Stat. 923 (1934), 11 U.S.C. §
103(a) (7)(195&).
85. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (6) (1958).
86. Bankruptcy Act § 1(14), as amended, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(14)
(1958).
87. Bookey v. King, 236 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1956); see In re Mingo Valley Creamery
Ass'n, 100 Fed. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1900); 1 Cor,mmm ff 3.109.
Bankruptcy Act § 63(8), added by 52 Stat. 873 (1938),
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However, both prior to and since the 1952 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor in proceedings under the first act of bankruptcy
has a complete defense if he can establish that he was not insolvent
at the time the petition was filed against him. Section 3(c) of the Act
expressly provides that if solvency at such date is proved by the alleged bankrupt, the proceedings shall be dismissed, but in such proceedings the burden of proving solvency is upon the debtor.
(a) Definition of "Insolvency.-The meaning of "insolvency" used
by the courts can be of crucial importance in determining whether
the debtor is insolvent at the time the petition was filed against him.
The Bankruptcy Act provides that the debtor should not be deemed
insolvent unless his assets at a fair valuation are less than the amount
of his debts. 89 This bankruptcy definition of insolvency differs from
ordinary commercial insolvency, frequently called insolvency in the
"equity sense," which means inability to pay debts as they mature 0
Seemingly to give the debtor a further break, the bankruptcy definition of insolvency is coupled with the requirement that the bankrupt's
exempt assets be included in his property in determining whether the
debtor is insolvent. 91 In a very real sense, therefore, the debtor may
be insolvent and yet the creditors may be unable to shift him into
bankruptcy because, including his exempt property on the asset side
of the ledger, he may not be regarded as insolvent in the bankruptcy
sense. Nevertheless, the creditors cannot lay a finger on the debtor's
exempt property even though it is an asset for the purposes of keeping
him out of bankruptcy. However, in determining whether the debtor
is insolvent, fraudulently transferred or concealed property is excluded.
III. THE PowER oF TH

TRusTEE IN BAN- RurcY

To SET ASIDE FRAuDuILENT CoNVEYANCES

We now move to the second important facet of the fraudulent conveyance. Having had a look at the fraudulent conveyance as an act
of bankruptcy, let us now examine the arsenal of weapons with which
88. Bankruptcy Act § 3c, as amended, 52 Stat. 844 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 21(c)
(1958).
89. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), as amended, 52 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19)
(1958).
90. See MAcLAcHLAN 12.

91. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), as amended, 52 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19)
(1958). For criticisms of the requirement that debtor's exempt assets are included in
the debtor's property in determining his solvency, see MAcLAcmAN 56-57; Joslin,
Insolvency in Bankruptcy: A Synthesis, 38 IND. L.J. 23, 25 (1962).
92. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), as amended, 30 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19)
(1958).
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the trustee in bankruptcy may attack a fraudulent transfer and bring
property back into the estate as an asset for equitable distribution
among creditors.
The trustee has a variety of armaments for attacking a fraudulent
transfer. There are three main provisions in the Bankruptcy Act having a direct bearing on the trustee's power to avoid such transfers:
section 70a(4), section 70e, and section 67d. Section 70a(4) vests the
trustee, as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, with3
title to property transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors.
Under section 70e, the trustee may avoid any transfer by a debtor
which by applicable federal or state law is fraudulent or voidable as
to any creditor having a provable claim under the Bankruptcy Act. 4
We have already had occasion to summarize the relevant provisions
of 67d. 5 As we have there seen, it incorporates into the Bankruptcy
Act most of the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act and contains some provisions not found in the Uniform Act.
A. Scope of Section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act
It becomes necessary at this juncture to examine section 67d of the
Act in more detail than we previously did. Paragraph 2 of that section
telescopes into one sentence four substantive sections of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act 6 The trustee can avoid transactions that
are fraudulent under this paragraph of section 67d if the transactions
are vulnerable against creditors, provided the transfer was perfected
within one year of the bankruptcy. For the purpose of the entire section 67d, as we have seen, a transfer is deemed to have been made at
the time it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from
the debtor could thereafter have acquired rights in the property so
transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein 1 This requirement as to the time when a transfer is made has no counterpart
in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Thus, under the one-year
time limitation of section 67d, as well as in the four-month period of
section 3b 98 of the Act (applicable to the fraudulent conveyance as an
act of bankruptcy), a transfer is not deemed to have been made for the
93. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(4), as amended, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(4) (1958).
94. Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §
110(e)(1) (1958).
95. See notes 24-35 supra and accompanying text.
96. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (2) (1958).
97. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(5), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (5) (1958).
98. Bankruptcy Act § 3(b), as amended, 66 Stat. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b)
(1958).
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purpose of the respective time limitations of each section until it has
become so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor
could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property transferred
superior to the rights of.the transferee. The purpose of postponing
the commencement of the limitation period in both sections until the
perfection of the transfer is, of course, to protect against secret transfers, and to prevent fraudulent transfers from becoming impregnable
to attack as fraudulent conveyances by reason of their being kept
secret until the limitation period has expired.
"Transfer," for the purposes of section 67d, as well as for the Act
generally, is so broadly defined in section 1(30), as we have already
seen, that it will include virtually every conceivable type of transfer,
whether voluntary or involuntary.99
Earlier it was necessary to have a look at the provisions of section
67d in order to explore the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy. 10 0 Now a somewhat different and more detailed examination
of the pertinent provisions is in order, so as to understand the power
of the trustee to upset the fraudulent conveyance and bring the property back into the debtor's estate.
The first provision of section 67d applies to conveyances by insolvents. Thus, section 67d(2) (a) condemns as fraudulent, as to creditors
existing at the time, transfers made without fair consideration by a
debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard
to his actual intent.101 Here the manifest purpose seems to be to set
up a test of constructive, as distinguished from actual, fraud-a test
of fraud in law as distinguished from fraud in fact. While the fundamental concept of fraudulent conveyances is that the grantor has the
evil purpose to defraud, nevertheless that intent will be inferred without regard to his actual state of mind, where, as in the case of a gift,
a debtor is-insolvent or makes himself insolvent. If the two conditions are present, namely, lack of fair consideration and insolvency or
resulting insolvency, there should be a conclusive presumption of
fraud, any intention to the contrary notwithstanding. 0 2 That is what
this section of the Bankruptcy Act, taken from section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, does; it makes a positive rule of law.
"Insolvency" within this provision of section 67d is not the same as
the general definition of that term in section 1(19), which was discussed in connection with whether the debtor could defeat a bank99. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
100. See material on the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy, pp. 383-97
supra.
101. Bankruptcy-Act § 67d(2), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.c. §
107(d) (2) (1958).
102. See 4 CoLrn, ff 67.34.
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ruptcy proceeding by showing that he was solvent at the time the
petition was filed. 10 3 There we saw that a person is insolvent whenever
the aggregate of his property, including the debtor's exempt property,
is not at a fair valuation sufficient in amount to pay his debts. On
the other hand, a person is insolvent within the intendment of section
67d of the Act when the present fair salable value of his property is
less than the amount required to pay his debts. 104 Construing the
corresponding provision of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
the courts have made it clear that the test of a debtor's insolvency is
inability to pay his debts in the ordinary course, not inability to raise
the money for them in the ordinary course. 05 Moreover, the debtor's
"property," under section 67d, includes only his nonexempt property. 10
Section 67d also contains a special provision dealing with the problem of determining when a partnership is insolvent. To determine
partnership insolvency there shall be added to the partnership property the present fair salable value of the separate property of each
general partner in excess of the amount required to pay his separate
debts, and also the amount realizable on any unpaid subscription to
the partnership of each limited partner.10 7
The expression "without fair consideration" is used in describing
most of the transfers or obligations declared to be fraudulent in section 67d. The Act provides that consideration given for property or
an obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1) when, in good faith, in exchange
and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such property or obligation is
received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt
in an amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value
of the property or obligation obtained. 08
A second provision of section 67d which the trustee can use to set
aside a transaction applies to conveyances by persons who engage in
business with an unreasonably small capital. Section 67d(2) (b) describes as fraudulent as to existing and future creditors a transfer
made or an obligation incurred without fair consideration while the
debtor is engaged, or is about to engage, in business for which his
103. See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text for that discussion.
104. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d), as amended, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11
107(d)(1)(d) (1958).
105. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Natl Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 169 AtI.
(1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934).
106. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(a), as amended, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11
107(d) (1) (a) (1958).
107. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d), as amended, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11
107(d) (1) (d) (1958).
108. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), as amended, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11
107(d) (1) (e) (1958).

U.S.C. §
209, 215
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §
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remaining capital will be unreasonably small. 1 9 This type of transaction can be struck down as fraudulent by the trustee in bankruptcy
without regard to the debtor's actual intent."0 Here, again, the fraudu-

lent intent will be inferred without regard to the debtor's actual
state of mind."' Where one who is engaged, or is about to engage,

in a hazardous business, makes a voluntary conveyance of the bulk
of his property, so that if he succeeds he may make a fortune and if

he fails he can leave the loss to fall upon his creditors, such convey-

ance will be held to have been made in fraud of his creditors.1 2 There

is no statutory requirement that insolvency be the result of the trans-

fer or the obligation." 3 While insolvency of the debtor, as such, is

not mentioned as an element in the Act, nevertheless there is some
judicial thought that it is practically necessary to show that the trans-

feror was insolvent, or that he intended to incur debts beyond his
ability to pay, in order to establish that his remaining property left

with him unreasonably small capital." 4 This provision of section 67d

condemns as fraudulent such a transaction not only as to existing
creditors, but also as to all those who became such during the continuance of the business or transaction." 5
Whether within the purview of this part of section 67d the amount

of property remaining in the hands of a person about to launch a
business transaction or a series of transactions is unreasonably small
109. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(b), as amended, 52 Stat. 877 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (2)(b) (1958).
110. "Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year
prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against
him is fraudulent . . . (b) as to then existing creditors and as to other persons who
become creditors during the continuance of a business or transaction, if made or
incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is engaged or is about to engage
in such business or transaction, for which the property remaining in his hands is an
unreasonably small capital, without regard to his actual intent .... ." Bankruptcy Act
67d(2)(b), as amended, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 107(d)(2)(b) (1958). In
the case of In re Atlas Foundry, 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957, this section was
applied to strike down a mortgage, where the purchasers of corporation gave mortgage
on plant realty to selling stockholders and also used almost all of corporation's cash
to pay for the stock, resulting in the corporation having an unreasonably small capital
to carry on the business.
111. McBride v. Bertsch, 58 F.2d 797 (W.D. Mich. 1930), aff'd, 58 F.2d 799 (6th
Cir. 1932); see Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Natl Bank, supra note 105 (decided under
the corresponding section of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which had been
adopted in Pennsylvania).
112. See State v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (M.S.
1944) (decided under the corresponding section of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, which had been adopted in Tennessee).
113. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, supra note 111.
114. Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d
Cir. 1940).
115. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(b), as amended, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 197(d)(2)(b) (1958).
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is, of course, a question of fact." 6 In order for the transfer to fall
within the condemnation of this provision, it is not necessary for the
debtor to be entering a new field of endeavor; it is enough if he contemplates expansion of his existing business." 7 The trustee, of course,
has the burden of proving that the transfer by the debtor was a reduction of the debtor's property to an unreasonably small capital.",
A third provision of section 67d which is available to the trustee to
upset a transaction applies to conveyances by a person about to incur
debts beyond his ability to pay. Section 67d(2) (c), taken in substance from section 6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
renders fraudulent as to existing and future creditors any transfers
made without fair consideration by a debtor who expects to incur
obligations beyond his ability to pay as they mature." 9 Such transactions are fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. Solvency
of the debtor at or after the time of the transfer in question presuma120
bly is no defense to an attack by the trustee under this provision.
Where the trustee proceeds under this provision, he must show more
than a chronological relation between the act of bankruptcy and the
subsequently incurred debts. He must adduce proof sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the debtor's transfer or obligation was contemporaneous with an intent or belief that his subsequent creditors
would be injured; that is to say, the trustee must show that the debtor
expected that he would be unable to take care of his debts as they
matured. 1 1 Here, again, the trustee must carry the burden of proving
that the debtor intended to incur obligations beyond his ability to
pay as they matured.1' 2
A fourth provision of section 67d available to the trustee for striking
down fraudulent transfers applies to conveyances made with actual
intent to defraud. Section 67d(2) (d) of the Bankruptcy Act condemns as fraudulent as to then existing and future creditors any transfer, if made with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed
116. Lackawanna Pants Mfg. Co. v. Wiseman, 133 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1943)
(construing and refusing to apply statute similar to this provision of Bankruptcy Act,
where debtor, giving a purchase money mortgage, had no property to begin with);
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, supra note 105; cf. Kindom Uranium Corp. v.
Vance, 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959) (decided under § 67d(2)(c) of Act).
117. McBride v. Bertsch, supra note 111 (applying corresponding section of Uniform
FraudulentConveyance Act).
118. Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, supra note 114 (trustee
failed to carry burden); In re Bette Jane Shoe Corp., 87 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.Y.
1949) (trustee failed to carry burden).
119. Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, supra note 116; Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2) (c),
as amended, 52 Stat. 875 (1938) 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2)(c) (1958).
120. See 4 Cor~tor I[67.36.
121. Ibid.
122. Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, supra note 116 (trustee carried the burden);
Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, supra note 114.
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in law, designed to hinder, delay, or defraud either existing or future
creditors. 2 3 This is taken virtually verbatim from section 7 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and is a recast of the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute of 13 Elizabeth, examined earlier. 24 It should
be noticed that this provision does not speak in terms of a conveyance
made without fair consideration, as did all the preceding provisions
of 67d which we have considered. Consequently, where a conveyance
is made with the requisite actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, the factor of fair consideration may not be material. 125 When
the trustee assails a transaction under this provision, it is not necessary in order to establish a fraudulent intent to show that the transaction was consummated during the bankrupts insolvency or that it
precipitated his insolvency.' 26 Thus, for the trustee to recover property fraudulently conveyed within the purview of this clause of section 67d, the fraudulent intent can be shown without proving the
insolvency of the transferring debtor. 27 On the other side of the
coin, neither does the existence of insolvency at the time of the questioned transaction necessarily prove the fraudulent intent required
by section 67d(2)(d). 28
Seldom will a fraudulent debtor disclose his fraudulent intent,
when making a transfer, in a manner capable of direct proof. Consequently, the court must find the requisite intent from the circumThe intent required by section
stances surrounding the transfer.'
67d(2) (d) may be predicated upon the concurrence of facts which,
while not direct evidence of the fraudulent intent, are sufficient to
lead to the firm conclusion that the transferor's conduct was motivated by such intent. 30 It has been suggested by an authority in the
field that, unless this provision of 67d is to have a severely restricted
scope, it would seem to cover cases where the trustee shows that the
transferor acted under circumstances which forbid any reasonable
conclusion other than that the purpose of the transfer was fraudulent
123. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), as amended, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §

107(d)(2)(d) (1958).
124. See notes 6-16 supra and accompanying text for this discussion.

125. See 4 COLLIER ff 67.37 at 370.
126. Ryan v. Jones, 92 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1950).

127. Senft v. Lewis, 239 Fed. 116 (2d Cir. 1917) (decided under former § 67e).
128. In re Peacock Food Mkts., Inc., 108 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
Title v. Smith, 309 U.S. 676 (1940)

(court found fraudulent conveyance).

129. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., 172 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1949); Wilson v. Robinson, 83 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1936) (dubious story about conveyance; court held fraudulent conveyance).
130. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., supra note 129; McWilliams v. Edmonson, 162 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 835 (1947); see
Karkus v. Siefert, 169 F. Supp. 662 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam 263 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.
1958).
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as to his creditors.' 3 ' We have learned that other provisions of section
67d take care of situations where fraud is presumed as a matter of
law, despite the lack of proof of actual fraudulent intent.
There are numerous circumstances from which courts may infer the
requisite fraudulent intent of the debtor when the trustee attacks a
transfer under this clause of the Bankruptcy Act.132 These include the
concealment of facts, false pretenses, and reservation by the transferor
of rights in the property transferred. 13 Another circumstance from
which fraudulent intent may be inferred is the existence of a gross discrepancy between the value of property transferred and the consideration received for the transferred property. 134 A circumstance from
which the debtor's intent to defraud can be inferred is the fact that he
absconded or secreted the proceeds of the transfer immediately after
he received them135 However, in order for the trustee to prove the
requisite fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor so as to have the
transfer declared fraudulent within section 67d(2) (d), the courts
have said that the evidence must be clear, cogent, unequivocal and
convincing 36
A fifth provision of section 67d which is available to the trustee to
torpedo fraudulent transactions condemns as fraudulent any transfer
to obtain funds with which to finance a preference. 37 This provision,
which has no counterpart in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
involves the Dean v. Davis' 38 situation. The facts of that case are
relatively simple. There the insolvent debtor, fearful of arrest at the
instance of a creditor bank because of forged endorsements, explained
the matter to his brother-in-law, who loaned him the money to pay off
the bank. The brother-in-law took a mortgage on the insolvent debtor's property as security for the loan. Shortly thereafter the debtor
became bankrupt. It was not established that the transfer to the bank
was a voidable preference, and the trustee apparently did not proceed
against the bank. Nevertheless, the trustee was successful in having
the mortgage to the brother-in-law uprooted as a fraudulent conveyance, even though the loan which the mortgage secured was an ade67.37, at 375.
131. See 4 CoT.T=
132. 4 Corima f 67.37(3) (for collection of cases on the many and varied circumstances from which fraud may be inferred).
133. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, supra note 105 (construing corresponding section of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
134. Wilson v. Robinson, supranote 129.
135. See Irving Trust Co. v. State Bankers' Financial Corp., 40 F.2d 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1930).
136. See Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F. Supp. 209, 212 (E.D. Mich. 1943)

unable to carry the burden).
137. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952),
107(d) (3) (1958).
138. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).

(trustees

11 U.S.C. §
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quate present consideration.
After being revamped by Congress a number of times, the present
section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act apparently codifies the rule of
Dean v. Davis. It now invalidates every transfer made and every
obligation incurred by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent within four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The transaction is invalid as to existing and future creditors.
In order to be vulnerable to attack under this section, however, the
transfer must have been made in contemplation of bankruptcy, with
intent to use the consideration obtained by the questioned transfer
to pay off debts. On the other hand, it would appear that the payment need not constitute a voidable preference under section 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act. Apparently it is enough to show that the creditor
was preferred as a result of the transaction. Moreover, in order for
the transaction to be subject to attack by the trustee the person furnishing the consideration to the debtor must know or believe that the
debtor intends to use the consideration to pay off debts. 13 9
There is one remaining section 67d arrow in the trustee's quiver for
shooting down fraudulent transactions. It concerns the conveyance of
partnership property. This is paragraph 4 of section 67d, which is
similar to section 8 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. It
strikes at transfers of partnership property to partners and transfers
of partnership property to third parties in consideration of payments
to partners. In summary, section 67d(4) gives the quietus to the transfer of partnership property and the incurring of partnership obligations within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, when
the partnership is insolvent or will thereby be rendered insolvent,
without regard to actual intent, if made or incurred (a) to a partner,
whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership debts,
or (b) to a person not a partner without fair consideration to the
partnership, as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners. Such transfers are fraudulent as to partnership creditors existing
at the time of such transfer or obligation. 40 If no consideration passes
to the partnership itself in connection with a transfer of its property
to another, the transaction can be avoided by the trustee irrespective
of benefits obtained therefrom by one of the partners.' 4 '
Already we have raised the question whether either actual knowledge of a fraudulent conveyance, or mere constructive notice of a
139. See Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 ("if the transferee
or obligee . . . knew or believed that the debtor intended to make such use of the
consideration.").
140. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(4), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (4) (1958).
141. In re Venie, 80 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
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conveyance that turns out to be fraudulent, will prevent the conveyance from being set aside by a creditor whose claim arose after
receiving such knowledge or such constructive notice by a recording
of the document. 42 We saw that the courts are in disagreement in
this area. A federal court has permitted a trustee in bankruptcy to
43
set aside such a conveyance on behalf of such subsequent creditors.
Apparently it was of no consequence that the subsequent creditors
had constructive notice of the transfer by virtue of recordation. As
the writer has earlier indicated, such constructive notice given through
a recorded conveyance that turns out to be fraudulent should not
prejudice the right of a subsequent creditor or the bankruptcy trustee
to set the conveyance aside. 44 The leading authorities in the field are
of the same view. 45
fide purchaser where
Presently we will look at the status of a bona
46
the conveyance has been declared fraudulent.
B. Limitations on the Power of the Trustee to Avoid a
Fraudulent Transfer
1. Necessity for Creditorwith Provable Claim.-It seems clear that
in order for the trustee to invalidate a transaction under section 67d
of the Bankruptcy Act the transaction must be fraudulent against
creditors who have claims provable in bankruptcy. Thus, section
67d(6) makes void as against the trustee in bankruptcy any transfer
or obligation declared fraudulent under section 67d "against creditors
of such debtor having claims provable under this act."' 41 To this extent the trustee's rights under section 67d are derivative. That is to
say, the trustee must prove the existence of a creditor with a provable
claim, as against whom the questioned transaction was fraudulent
when it was made.
While section 67d(6) of the Act gives the trustee power to set aside
as fraudulent only those transfers which are fraudulent against creditors having provable claims under section 63,148 nevertheless, for the
purpose of determining whether a transfer is fraudulent as to creditors
142. See material on constructive notice to subsequent creditor as negating fraudulent
aspect of transfer, pp. 389-91 supra.
143. McBride v. Bertsch, supra note 111 (trustee set aside a recorded trust arrangement under a situation arising under section 67d(2) (b), which makes engaging in
business with inadequate capital fraudulent as to subsequent creditors).
144. See material on constructive notice to subsequent creditor as negating fraudulent
aspect of transfer, pp. 389-91 supra.
145. See 4 CoLL=E
67.35, at 364; 1 GLm=, § 343c.
146. See material on the protection of the bona fide purchaser, pp. 408-10 infra.
147. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1942), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (6) (1958).
148. Bankruptcy Act § 63a, as amended, 48 Stat. 923 (1934), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1958).
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under sections 67d(2)-(4), the Act does not limit "creditor" to one

having a provable claim. 49 Thus, in defining "creditor" for the purpose of determining whether a transfer is in fraud of creditors, section
67d(1) defines a "creditor" as a person in whose favor a debt exists;
"debt" is any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated
or unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent. 50 So, "creditor" under
this section could include the holder of a claim not provable in bankruptcy. Thus, a transfer made for the purpose of defrauding a tort
claimant for negligent injuries could, it seems, clearly be fraudulent
because the injured party is a "creditor." But unless the tort claimant
has a suit pending at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
the claimant does not have a provable claim under the Act.' 51 Conse-

quently, if the tort claimant is the only creditor into whose shoes the
trustee can step, ostensibly the transfer could not be nullified by the
the injured tort claimant seems
trustee, although a transfer to15defeat
2

fraudulent under section 67d.

The result of providing under section 67d(6) that the trustee cannot set aside a transfer as fraudulent unless there is a creditor with
a provable claim is that certain transfers are fraudulent conveyances
so as to constitute an act of bankruptcy and yet cannot be set aside
by the trustee. These ostensibly anomalous positions can perhaps be
reconciled on a rational basis. Section 67d(6), which limits the trustee's powers to set aside a transfer to situations where there is a
creditor with a provable claim, is quite properly concerned only with
nullifying transfers and obligations that are fraudulent as against creditors entitled to participate in the bankruptcy distribution, i.e., creditors having provable claims. That is to say, the trustee is permitted
by the Act to set aside a transaction only for creditors who can share
in the bankrupt's estate. The trustee is thus not given power under
section 67d(6) to upset a transfer unless it injures a creditor who has
a provable claim and is thus entitled to share in the assets of the
bankrupt debtor. On the other hand, the broad definition of "creditor" for determining whether the transfer is fraudulent under section
67d(1) has its purpose also. There the tort claimant, who has no
provable claim at the time of the transfer, nevertheless seems to be
149. See notes 75-86 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect.
150. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1) (1958).
151. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), as amended, 48 Stat. 923 (1934), 11 U.S.C. §
103(a) (7) (1958).
152. In non-bankruptcy cases, a tort claimant generally is considered as a creditor

for the purpose of setting aside a fraudulent conveyance, sometimes on the theory that
his debt, when liquidated by judgment, relates back to the time of its origin. Babirecki
v. Virgil, 97 N.J. Eq. 315, 127 Ad. 594 (1925); Washington Nat'l Bank v. Beatty, 77
N.J. Eq. 252, 76 Adt. 442 (1910); Henry v. Yost, 88 Wash. 93, 152 Pac. 714 (1915).
See also 4 COLLmER i 67.41.
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a creditor, so that sections 67d(2)-(4) are operative to determine
whether the transfer is fraudulent as to him. If the tort claimant as to
whom the transfer is fraudulent, but who then has no provable claim,
institutes his tort action for negligence prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the fraudulent transfer not only is voidable by the
trustee, but also the tort claimant is then entitled to share in he
distribution of the estate. 10
2. Protection of the Bona Fide Purchaser.-Thereis a further limitation on the power of the trustee in bankruptcy to vitiate a transfer
found to be fraudulent. That limitation is contained in section 67d(6)
of the Act. 154 This section, in nullifying transfers and obligations as
against the trustee, does so except as to a bona fide purchaser, lienor,
or obligee for a present fair equivalent value. Around these claimants
is thrown a screen of protection into which two interdependent elements enter-their good faith and also their having paid a present fair
equivalent value. If the grantee can show that he has (a) given the
requisite value (b) in good faith, he goes free, regardless of the fact
that the grantor's intent was fraudulent. However, in order for the
transferee completely to withstand an attack by the trustee, there
must be present both these elements.'55
As we have already learned, the bona fide purchaser has been protected from early times, beginning with the ancient statute of 13
Elizabeth,'5 6 and continuing through the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 5 7
Section 67d(6) also gives partial protection to purchasers, lienors,
and obligees who have given less than fair consideration, but who
entered into the transaction without "actual fraudulent intent." 158
Such claimants are permitted to retain the property or obligation as
security until they are reimbursed. 5 9 But such a transferee cannot
come within this protecting pale of section 67d(6) where the transferee is not a good faith purchaser but instead is a guilty participant
in the fraud. 160 '

Two distinct safety valves are thus found in section 67d(6). The
153. See 4 CowLu ff 67.41.
154. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1942), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d) (6) (1958).
155. See 4 RE MwGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 1652.2 (Henderson ed. 1957).
156. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
157. UNiom FRAuDuLENT CONVEYANCE AcT § 0; 9B UNwonm LAws ANNOTATED
45 (Supp. 1962).
158. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1942), 11 U.S.C.
§ 107 (d)(6) (1958).
159. Ibid. In re Peoria Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1943) (permitted
chattel mortgagee to keep his lien as security to the extent of value given, where not
guilty of fraud).
160. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., supra note 129.
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first one completely exempts bona fide purchasers, lienors, and obligees
for a present fair equivalent value from invalidation of their rights by
the trustee. The second safety valve allows purchasers, lienors, and
obligees who have given less than fair consideration, but who had no
actual fraudulent intent, to retain their rights until they are reimbursed.
When the fraudulent intent of the grantor has been shown, then
the burden of proving that the transferee qualifies as a bona fide
purchaser shifts to the transferee. If he cannot carry that burden, he
loses and the fraudulent conveyance will be set aside by the trustee.161
"Good faith" on the part of the transferee, so as to be protected under
section 67d(6) of the Act, seems to presuppose lack of knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry. 162
Such knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding
163
the transfer.
Lack of honest belief on the part of the transferee invoking the
protection of section 67d(6) has been considered fraudulent. 1' A
man cannot, it is said, successfully claim that he is acting honestly
when he willfully shuts his eyes for fear that leaving them open will
reveal unpleasant facts.165 As the court has rather strikingly put it,
where only inexcusable naivete would allow one to believe that transfers made by the bankrupt were not made with fraudulent intent,
the trustee has made out a prima facie case to have the transfer set
aside. 16
One particular type of transaction that the courts will carefully
scrutinize is the intra-family transfer. Completely upsetting one such
transfer, the court made this telling observation in denying the transferee the protection accorded a bona fide purchaser:
The statute deals with and protects substantial claims of persons who have
dealt in fairness and good faith and who, because they have done so, are
entitled to equitable protection. It has no application to nepotic and fictitious arrangements of this kind entered into by members of a debtor's family
to defeat creditors while keeping the property safely in the family. 167

161. Ibid. Karkus v. Siefert, 169 F. Supp. 662 (D.N.J. 1958) (trustee successfully
invoked New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, as well as section 67d of the
Bankruptcy Act, to upset the conveyance).
162. Davis v. Hudson Trust Co., 28 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
655 (1929) (trustee invoked New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act to set
transfer aside); Hartzman v. Lynch, 54 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1931) (decided when present
provision of Bankruptcy Act was found in section 67e of the Act).

163. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., supra note 129; In re
Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (trustee used local faudulent conveyance
law, as well as section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act).
164. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., supra note 129.

165. Id. at 329.
166. Ibid.
167. McWilliams v. Edmonson, 162 F.2d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 1947) (trustee upset
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(a) Adequacy of Considerationas Relevant to the Grantee's Good
Faith.-Inadequacy of consideration is one circumstance tending to
show lack of good faith by a transferee seeking protection as a bona
fide purchaser. Inadequacy of consideration, of course, is connected
with both facets of the fraudulent conveyance. As we have learned,"'
it will help to show the debtor's intent to defraud. Since the buyer
knows what he is getting, inadequacy of consideration will also help
to show the grantee's bad faith. Hence when consideration for a
transfer is allegedly insufficient, it is then necessary not only to consider the fraudulent intent of the debtor, but the same evidence can
be used to test the good faith of the grantee.
In testing the good faith of the grantee, we are concerned, as we
have seen, with whether he had knowledge or notice of the debtor's
fraudulent intent. Mere inadequacy of price is not enough of itself
to require a finding of bad faith on the part of the grantee. Something more than a bad bargain is necessary. There must be gross disparity in values to justify the conclusion that the transfer was frauduto conclude that there was bad faith as distinct
lent; one must be able
1 69
from a tight trade.

A well-known authority on the law of fraudulent conveyances has
summed up the matter in this fashion:
It may be stated, therefore, that an inadequacy of price which (a) re-

mains unexplained at the close of the case and (b) is so great as to show,
without the necessity for argument, that the parties could not have bargained
with each other as people normally trade, requires the setting aside of the
transaction. 170

C. The Position of the Creditor Who Takes a Conveyance
as Payment for His Antecedent Debt
Before leaving this aspect of the subject of fraudulent conveyances,
perhaps a word should be said about the position of a creditor who
takes a conveyance in payment for his antecedent debt, knowing that
the grantor-debtor is trying to fleece his other creditors. Does the
mere fact that the creditor who receives this preferential payment of
his antecedent debt, knowing of the debtor's intent to defraud other
creditors, render the transfer to him a fraudulent conveyance?
conveyance by using section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act). To the same effect is Wilson

v. Robinson, 83 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1936) (trustee successfully invoked New York
fraudulent conveyance statute).
168. See notes 71-73 & 134 supra and accompanying text on this point.
169. See 1 GrLEN § 296. Where debtor sold a potential judgment for personal

injuries up to 7,500 dollars on its face, for the release of a 500 dollar debt, it was held
a fraudulent conveyance under the New York Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
In re Friedman, 72 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1934).

170. 1 GI~m- § 298 (collecting many non-bankruptcy cases).
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The position of the purchaser in bad faith must be sharply contrasted with the creditor who takes a conveyance as security for, or in
payment of, a debt which the debtor owes him, although the creditor
may be fully aware of not only the debtor's insolvency but also of
the fact that the debtor is trying to defraud his other creditors. The
purchaser who takes in bad faith is, as we have seen, guilty of participating in a fraudulent conveyance, and the transfer can be set
aside by the trustee in bankruptcy.' 7 ' The purchaser is really a volunteer. In such a situation, he has nothing at stake-no self-interest to
serve. He may, with perfect safety, keep out of the transaction.
Knowing the evil purpose of the grantor-debtor, a putative grantee
can very easily refuse to have anything to do with the matter. If the
purchaser falls in with the debtor's mephitic purpose to defraud his
creditors, the grantee-purchaser has only himself to blame when the
transaction is set aside. With his eyes open, he has aided the debtor
in defrauding his creditors.
On the other hand, the man with the pre-existing debt wrongs no
one in seeking payment of, or security for his debt. All that the creditor receives by way of a conveyance from his debtor is a preferential
payment of his debt, and there is nothing morally wrong with paying
one's debts. Hence, in non-bankruptcy cases at least, if all that has
occurred is a preference there is no fraudulent conveyance, regardless
of the debtor's wicked intent and the grantee's knowledge upon the
matter.172 In short, the mere fact that the preferred creditor knows of
the debtor's intent to defraud other creditors does not render him a
participant in the fraud. The creditor takes the property in payment
of, or as security for, a pre-existing indebtedness. Taking a transfer
in payment of or to secure an antecedent indebtedness is fair value
under the fraudulent conveyance sections of the Bankruptcy Act, as
well as under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 1' The creditor, in such circumstances, has an interest to serve. He can keep out
of the transaction only at the risk of taking a loss on the claim which
the debtor owes him. The law throws upon such a creditor no duty
of protecting other creditors. So the fact that the creditor knows of
the debtor's intent to defraud his other creditors, when the creditor
takes a conveyance in payment of his antecedent debt, does not
render the conveyance fraudulent. 74
The idea that payment of a pre-existing debt is not a fraudulent
171. See protection of the bona fide purchaser, pp. 408-10 supra.
172. See-1 GLENN § 298a.
173. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1958);
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 3(b).
174. Non-bankruptcy cases: English v.Brown, 229 Fed. 24 (3d Cir. 1916); Hogeboom v.Milliman, 202 Iowa 817, 211 N.W. 396 (1926); Lockren v.Rustan, 9 N.D.
43,81 N.W.60 (1899).
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conveyance cannot, of course, be carried too far. If, for example, the
grantee with a pre-existing debt takes, as payment, property which
goes beyond the debt in value, the difference being made up by a
false and spurious claim, the transaction will be wholly set aside as a
fraudulent conveyance. At common law, the creditor-grantee has
been denied the right to hold the property as security for the debt
which was actually due him. 115 We have learned that under the Bankruptcy Act the grantee is permitted, where the consideration paid was
not fair, but where he has not been guilty of actual fraud, to hold the
property as security for the amount he has paid.1 76 The grantee-creditor, who takes property beyond the value of his claim as payment, has
gone beyond his right to secure a preferential payment and has allowed the debt to be used as part of a larger transaction by which the
debtor has tried to defraud his creditors.
D. The Trustee's Powers To Set Aside FraudulentTransfers
Under Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act
Under section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act any transfer by a debtor
which by applicable federal or state law is fraudulent or voidable as
to any creditor having a provable claim under the Act may be avoided
by the trustee.1 77 This section of the Act makes available to the trustee
the entire law of fraudulent conveyances and other transactions by
a debtor which are voidable at the instance of creditors. The voidability of transactions and obligations of the bankrupt, under this section, are entirely dependent upon local law or federal law outside
the Bankruptcy Act. New causes of action are not created by section
70e; the trustee merely succeeds to existing causes of action. He is
simply remitted to the rights of creditors to avoid transfers under nonbankruptcy law. The rights of action which pass to the trustee under
section 70e are those which, had bankruptcy not intervened, could
have been enforced by creditors.
Since the trustee's rights are solely dependent upon relevant local
law, there is no federally fixed time limitation within which the voidable transaction must have occurred. In this regard, section 70e of the
Act is in sharp contrast with the situation in which the trustee is attacking a transaction under section 67d, where the transaction in
question must have occurred within one year of the bankruptcy.178
In order for section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act to be available to
175. Baldwin v. Short, 125 N.Y. 553, 26 N.E. 928 (1891) (non-bankruptcy case).
176. See notes 158-60 supra and accompanying text.
177. Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
110(e)(1) (1958).
178. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918).

§
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the trustee, however, there must be at least one existing, actual, flesh
and blood creditor of the bankrupt, with a claim provable under the
Act, who could have, in the absence of bankruptcy, successfully attacked the transfer or obligation in question as voidable as against
him.179 Since the trustee's right to avoid a transfer or obligation under section 70e is in the nature of a right by subrogation to, and
wholly dependent upon the existence of rights of creditors with a
provable claim who could have avoided the transaction in the absence
of bankruptcy, defenses good as against such a creditor are likewise
good as against the trustee. Thus, the trustee may be barred by
statutes of limitations or laches, where these defenses would have
barred the way of the creditor. 180
The great variety of transactions within the scope of section 70e of
the Bankruptcy Act, including fraudulent conveyances which might
otherwise be voidable under section 67d of the Act, gives the trustee
a choice of weapons with which to attack the particular transaction.
There may thus be an overlapping of the Bankruptcy Act and state
fraudulent conveyance law. Under section 70e, it is common-place
for the trustee to invoke the applicable state Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. 181 Or the trustee may successfully launch a twopronged offensive, going under the local fraudulent conveyance law
as well as under the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.18 Under the local law the trustee may have a longer
period in which he can attack a transfer than under a corresponding
section of the Bankruptcy Act. 18
1. FraudulentRetention of Possession and Ostensible Ownership.Within the announced purpose of this article to survey the fraudulent
conveyance in bankruptcy, it is not possible to explore all the myriad
situations which fall within the omnibus sweep of section 70e of the
Bankruptcy Act. It will be enough to mark out the guide lines of
some of the more troublesome and recurring types of transactions.
179. See Hartman v. Lauchli, 23& F.2d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 1956); In re Cable-Link,
135 F. Supp. 277, 281 (E.D. Mich. 1955). In Costello v. Bank of America Natl Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 141 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1956), an assignment was originally
vulnerable because not recorded, but since the account was collected before bankruptcy, the trustee had no rights.
180. Heffron v. Duggins, 115 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1940).
181. E.g., Hertzman v. Lynch, 54 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1931) (decided when present
section 70e was found in section 67e of the Bankruptcy Act); Wilson v. Robinson,
83 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1936) (trustee successfully invoked New York fraudulent conveyance statute).
182. E.g., Karkus v. Siefert, 169 F. Supp. 662 (D.N.J. 1958) (trustee used New
Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, as well as section 67d of the Bankruptcy
Act); In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (trustee used state fraudulent
conveyance act, as well as section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act).
183. Davis v. Wolf, 147 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1945).
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A garden variety type of transaction arising under section 70e of
the Act is that of fraudulent retention of possession and ostensible
ownership. Section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act, based upon the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, may not cover fraudulent retention
of possession. 1 In this area, therefore, the trustee may be remitted
to the local law on the subject. The leading decision in this area is
Twyne's Case,1' decided in 1601. This case involved a pretended
preference of a creditor who permitted the debtor to retain possession
of and enjoy the income from property and brand it (sheep) as his
own, although the property supposedly had been transferred to the
creditor to pay his claim against the debtor. Holding this to be fraudulent under the statute of 13 Elizabeth, the Court stressed, among
other things, that the debtor continued in possession of the goods and
used them as his own and that by reason thereof he traded with
others and deceived them. Retention of possession, of course, can
cause injury both to present and subsequent creditors. The present
creditor uses the vendor's retention of possession as evidence of a
fraudulent intent on the debtor's part-a purpose not to make a genuine sale, but rather a device to defraud the creditor. However, there
is another element as well; seeing no change in the debtor's position,
the creditor may, to his prejudice, forbear to press his claim. The case
of the subsequent creditor is that he extended credit on the faith of
the vendor's apparent ownership. As to each class of creditors, then,
a misrepresentation works injury.186
Cases involving fraudulent retention of possession and ostensible
ownership are extremely important. Statistically there are many of
them. However, the doctrine of retention of possession and ostensible
ownership as a species of fraudulent conveyance has so many ramifications and local variations that no effort will be made here to give
an exhaustive treatment. It is generally agreed that, under applicable
local law, retention of possession by a seller is a badge of fraud, but
there is no uniformity as to whether it is conclusive evidence of fraud,
prima facie evidence of fraud, or merely admissible evidence of fraud
on creditors. 187
2. Transfers Requiring Recordation or Notice.-Perhaps the most
prolific instances of fraudulent and voidable transfers that are subject
to challenge by the trustee under section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act
are found in those situations where registration, recordation, or prescribed notice are mandatory under state law in order to save a given
184. See MAcLAcHLA 255-56, 270.
185. 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601).

186. 1 GLENN § 347.
187. 1 GLENN §§ 354, 355; MAcLAcHLAx § 225.
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transfer from being struck down as fraudulent and void. This really
is a codified species of fraudulent retention and ostensible ownership

law.
In order to build up a sound credit system and to strike down secret
conveyances and liens, the several states have enacted their own ideas
of how to accomplish this avowed purpose; generally this has taken
the form of constructive notice to the world by means of recording
and/or registry statutes. But once more it must be emphasized that
the applicable state law is determinative as to the characteristics,
nature, effect, and validity of such transfers, so that rigid formulation
of applicable rules is not possible. In the category of transfers voidable under section 70e of the Act, we have such devices as the chattel
mortgage, the conditional sale, assignment of accounts receivable,
bulk sales, mortgages, deeds of trust, pledges, equitable pledges, and
trust receipts. Here, of course, the emphasis shifts to specific state
legislation regarding requirements for recordation and giving notice.
Because of the local variations, no comprehensive treatment can here
be given. The cases of this sort open up such problems as the definition of "creditors" as to whom such transactions are voidable when
the state recording statutes have not been complied with. That is to
say, is the unrecorded transfer void as to a simple contract creditor, 188
or is the unrecorded instrument void only as to lien creditors? 8 9 In
order for the unrecorded instrmnent to be void, must the creditor be
one who becomes a creditor while the transfer is unrecorded, 190 or is
the unrecorded transfer also void as against prior creditors?' 91 Again,
was the recording sufficiently timely to satisfy the requirements of
the state recording statute? 192 The answers to all these questions are,
of course, completely dependent upon the meaning of the applicable
state recording statute. Under section 70e the applicable state law
is decisive as to whether the transfer can withstand an assault by the
trustee.
In the twenty-eight states which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, it will not be necessary to differentiate between the
various types of financing devices, such as chattel mortgage, trust
receipt, etc. Under Article 9 of the Code, secured financing of chattels is accomplished by use of a "security interest," created by a
"security agreement," with the same rules applying to all security
agreements. 193 Article 9 of the Code provides comprehensively for
188. Deane v. Fidelity Corp., 82 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
189. In re Consorto Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1954).
190. Ibid.
191. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1892) (non-bankruptcy case).
192. Ibid. For a good discussion of the various state views of the effect of a tardy
recordation of a chattel mortgage, see In re Consorto Constr. Co., supra note 189.
193. UNwoma_ CommmEcrA CODE §§ 9-102, -105.
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the pledge, chattel mortgage, conditional sale, trust receipt, factor's
lien, assignment of accounts receivable, and other security devices.
Everything is covered except security agreements regarding real
estate. This means that the requirements for perfecting security interests, so as to withstand an attack by a creditor, will be uniform in
the states adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.
3. Floating Liens on Shifting Property and Assignment of Accounts
Receivable.-A virtual Pandora's box of troubles for the trustee in
bankruptcy has been the assignment of accounts receivable and mortgages on shifting goods, such as stock in trade. This has been a fertile
field for the trustee to invoke state law, through the use of section 70e,
to try to uproot the security device. To obtain a loan, a debtor may assign his accounts receivable, as well as giving a chattel mortgage on
his stock of goods with a clause covering "after-acquired" property. If
the debtor is required to collect the accounts as the agent of the
lender and to turn over the proceeds to the lender, then there is not
much difficulty; the assignment and mortgage has been upheld under
the law of most states. 1' But trouble occurs when the agreement
does not require the debtor to collect the accounts from sale of the
shifting stock of goods and turn over the collections to the lender. In
short, the debtor may be permitted to sell goods and reinvest the
proceeds, sell again and reinvest. Under the doctrine of Benedict v.
Ratner,15 a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States applying New York law, if the debtor can collect the accounts and not
pay them over to the lender, the assignment is void as to the trustee
in bankruptcy of the debtor for failure to transfer dominion adequately. If the agreement between the debtor and the lender permits
such practice, it is void as against creditors under the law of many
states; and even if the agreement requires a strict segregation of the
proceeds and prompt payment to the lender, the transaction may be
void under applicable state law if the actual practice by the parties
under the arrangement does not require a prompt accounting to the
lender. 9 6 Also, an assignment of accounts otherwise valid may be
vulnerable to attack by the trustee by invoking state law through the
use of section 70e, if no control is maintained of goods returned for
credit upon accounts receivable. 97 Such decisions indicate that the
parties must treat the assignment as a real transfer of dominion and
not a pretended one. Recordation of the mortgage and assignment
generally will not protect the lender if there is an express or tacit
194. See 2 GLENN §§ 582-84.
195. 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (applying New York law).
196. See Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 134 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1943).
197. Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930), deoiron on remand
aft'd, 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931).

1964]

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE IN BANKRUPTCY

417

agreement creating the power in the transferor (debtor) to exercise
dominion over the property. 198
If an assignment of accounts receivable or a chattel mortgage were
sustained where the debtor is given a free hand with respect to
whether he will reinvest the proceeds from the sale of the shifting
stock of goods covered by the security device in question, it would
seem to afford a ready-made shield by which the debtor could fend
off the rest of his creditors. The debtor could use this loose type of
security device to insulate himself from the rest of his creditors, and
yet, ostensibly, he could carry on business as usual with the consent
of the friendly secured creditor. If bankruptcy hovered, the secured
creditor apparently could then step in and take priority with respect
to the accounts and remaining goods in the shifting stock.
However, the Uniform Commercial Code, presently adopted in
twenty-eight states, seems to validate this type of security arrangement. The doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner appears to be either severely limited or abolished by the Code. 199 The official comments on
the text of the Uniform Commercial Code declare that the Code expressly validates the floating charge or lien on a shifting stock, pointing out that the Code provides that a security interest is not invalid
or fraudulent by reason of liberty in the debtor to dispose of the
collateral without being required to account for proceeds or substitute
new collateral; and that the Code repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.200 Expensive policing of the security by the creditor, thought to
be required by the Benedict v. Ratner doctrine, apparently was an
important policy consideration that caused the drafters of the Code
to validate such security devices.
4. Extent of Recovery by the Trustee in Bankruptcy Under Section
70e of the Bankruptcy Act.-A very knotty section 70e problem comes
up when there is a security transaction that is void as to one creditor
but is not void as to other creditors. What are the rights of the
trustee in that situation? To illustrate, suppose a debtor executes a
mortgage in the sum of fifty thousand dollars, but before the mortgage is recorded a creditor comes into the picture in the amount of
one hundred dollars. Assume that as to this intervening creditor, the
mortgage is void under the applicable state recording statute. In the
198. See 4 CoLr ff 70.77. For a scholarly treatment of why such a loose security
device has been regarded by many courts as fraudulent, see 2 GLENN §§ 583a, 584,
590, 591. See also Pabst Brewing Co. v. Butchart, 67 Minn. 191, 69 N.W. 809 (1897).
199. UNrironm Commmcrr CODE § 9-205.

200. See

UNIFoRm ComEmciA.

Con.

§ 9-205, comment. For a vigorous endorse-

ment of the Uniform Commercial Code rule validating recorded floating liens and
abolishing the Benedict v. Ratner rule, see Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and
Revision of Chattel Security, 1952 Wis. L. Rtv. 348, 353, 365-66, 391.
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absence of bankruptcy, the intervening creditor would have only a
first claim in the amount of one hundred dollars as against the mortgagee who was late in recording his mortgage. However, in bankruptcy, the situation is a horse of an entirely different color. There,
the trustee in bankruptcy steps into the shoes of the hundred dollar
creditor and uproots the fifty thousand dollar mortgage in toto. The
mortgaged property then becomes an asset available for all creditors,
and the mortgagee has only the status of an unsecured creditor. This
is the teaching of Moore v. Bay,20 1 decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1931.
Moore v. Bay and its consequences have been subject to vigorous
attack by writers in the field.m However, ever since that decision it
has been considered proper to invalidate the mortgage completely,
even though 3the only creditor entitled to invalidate it has an insignificant claim. 20
IV. THE FiRuDuLET CONVEYANCE
FOR DENYiN G

A GROUND
BAXIMWrT A DIscIAzGE

The fraudulent conveyance is of significant importance in three

facets of bankruptcy. As we have seen, it constitutes an act of bankruptcy and it can be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy. There is a
third role which the fraudulent conveyance plays in bankruptcy. It
can be used to deprive the bankrupt of his discharge. Section 14c of
the Act provides that a fraudulent conveyance of concealment not
more than twelve months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition
is a ground for denying a discharge.0 4 However, a concealment by
205
the bankrupt of his exempt property will not prevent the discharge.
Perhaps the main question that arises at this point is whether actual
fraud is required. We have seen that under section 67d there are
several types of transactions that are regarded as fraudulent convey201. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
202. MAcLAcHLAN 330-35; Scott, The Meaning of the Provisions for Recordatlion of

a Transfer as Applicable to Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act, 18 VA. L. REv.
249,265-69 (1932).

203. City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942); Friedman v.
Sterling Refrigerator Co., 104 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1939) ($14.23 invalidated $534.25).
204. "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ...
at any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed,
or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property, with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors." Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), as amended,
71 Stat. 599 (1957), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (4) (1958). Earlier we had a look at the meaning of the "transfer," "concealment," and "removal" of property. See notes 40-61 supra
and accompanying text.
205. In re Chase, 141 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1944).
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ances although they do not require an actual intent by the debtor to
defraud his creditors. Consequently, there is an important question
as to whether the debtor must have a conscious desire to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors before he will be denied a discharge on the
ground that he committed a fraudulent conveyance. The question is
not completely free from doubt. However, there is much authority
supporting the view that only actual fraud will prevent a discharge,
since the purpose of the Act is to protect against discharge only by a
dishonest debtor.206 Moreover, it should be noted that the Bankruptcy
Act precludes a discharge only where the bankrupt has removed,
destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or
concealed, any of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
his creditors.2 0 7 This terminology is the same as that found in section
3a(1) setting forth the definition of a fraudulent conveyance for an
act of bankruptcy prior to the 1952 amendment of the Act. We recall
that prior to that amendment an actual intent to defraud was an
essential ingredient of a fraudulent conveyance which would constitute an act of bankruptcy. °
While the courts declare that the intent to defraud must be actual,
as distinguished from constructive, 209 nevertheless a "conveyance while
insolvent, without anything approaching a fair consideration to
creditors .. .is presumptively fraudulent within the discharge provisions of the Act."2 10
Section 14c prescribes that a fraudulent conveyance that will
constitute a ground for denying a discharge must have occurred not
more than twelve months before the filing of the bankruptcy petition;
but this section does not specify how the twelve-month period shall
be measured.2 1 ' We learned that for the purposes of deciding whether
a fraudulent conveyance constitutes an act of bankruptcy 21 2 and
whether the trustee is precluded by reason of the twelve-month time
limitation from setting aside a fraudulent conveyance21 3 the transfer
does not take place within the purview of the Act until the transfer
has become so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the
debtor could thereafter have acquired rights in the property so trans206. That there must be actual fraudulent intent, as distinguished from constructive
intent, to bar a discharge, see In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1956); In re Simon,
197 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); 1 Cormrmm ff 14.47.
207. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), as amended, 71 Stat. 599 (1957), 11 U.S.C. §
32(c) (4) (1958).
208. See notes 62-74 supra and accompanying text, where this point isdiscussed.
209. In re Nemerov, 134 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y.1955).

210. Rothschild v.Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 212 F.2d 584,585 (2d Cir. 1954).
211. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), as amended, 71 Stat. 599 (1957), 11 U.S.C. §

32(c) (4) (1958).
212. See text dealing with time when transfer occurs, pp. 388-89 supra.
213. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.

420

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 17

ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein. The provision
of the Act relating to the fraudulent conveyance and concealment as
a ground for denying a discharge is silent with respect to the time
when the transfer is deemed to have taken place. The decided cases
do not resolve the matter, but a prominent work on the subject takes
the position that the transfer should not be considered complete until
the transfer is so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the
debtor-transferor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired
any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the
transferee therein.214 This interpretation would be in accord with the
measurement of time set forth with regard to the fraudulent conveyance as an act of bankruptcy, as well as the time limitation on the
power of the trustee to set aside such a transfer.
214. See 1 CoLLIE ff 14.46.

